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JURISDICTION 
Defendant-appellee Zions First National Bank ("Zions") 
agrees with plaintiff-appellant Gina Cook ("Cook") that this Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT nv TfifiTTRfi 
I. Did the district court correctly grant summary 
judgment in favor of Zions on Cook's first cause of action for 
breach of an express employment contract on the ground that no 
employment contract as to sick leave exists between the parties? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g. . 
Record ("R.") at 65, 68, 95, 392-93, 547-54, 577. The applicable 
standard of review for summary judgments is contained in Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c) . This Court is ""to determine only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial 
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material 
fact.'" Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 277 Utah Adv. Rep. 
58, 59 (Utah Nov. 15, 1995) (quoting State v. Feree. 794 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1989)) . 
II. Should the district court have also dismissed Cook's 
first cause of action on the ground that, even if she were able to 
establish that the 1988 "Employment Benefits Disclosure Form" is a 
binding written employment contract, Zions did not breach the 
alleged contract? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g.. 
R. 441, 480, 515-17, 524, 528-33, 544-45, 547-48, 565-66, 584-87. 
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This Court may affirm the trial court's decision whenever it can do 
so on proper grounds. Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980) (footnote omitted) ; see also Bailey-Allen Co. v. 
Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421# 424 (Utah App. 1994) ("Court of Appeals may 
affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground.") 
III. Did the district court correctly grant summary 
judgment in favor of Zions on Cook's second cause of action for 
breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract on the ground that 
Utah law does not recognize such a cause of action based on an 
employer's alleged delay in allowing an employee to take time off 
pursuant to a sick leave policy? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g. . 
R. at 71, 393-98, 479, 552-54, 558-59, 576-79. The applicable 
standard or review is contained Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
district court's summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Ward, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59. 
IV. Should the district court have also dismissed Cook's 
implied contract claim on the ground that she failed to provide any 
legal or factual support for the claim? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g. . 
R. at 399, 516-17, 524, 544-45, 547-48, 577-80. This Court may 
affirm the district court's decision on any proper ground. 
Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328; Bailey-Allen Co.. 876 P.2d at 424. 
V. Did the district court correctly grant summary 
judgment in favor of Zions on Cook's implied contract claim on the 
223466 1 2 
ground that Zions clearly and conspicuously disclaimed any 
contractual intent? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g. , 
69-70, 398-401, 478-79, 548-52, 579-80, 595-96. The applicable 
standard of review is set forth at Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
district court's summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Ward, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59. 
VI. Should the district court have dismissed Cook's 
third cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing because Utah law does not recognize the 
implied covenant in the employment context, and because her implied 
covenant claim fails as a matter of law because she has no 
employment contract with Zions? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, e.g., 
R. at 71, 402-04, 559-60, 582. This Court may affirm the district 
court's decision on any proper ground. Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328; 
Bailey-Allen Co.. 876 P.2d at 424. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Gina Cook is currently an employee of Zions. She claims 
that Zions is responsible for the consequences of the delay in her 
taking one day off work, as authorized by Zions' attendance and 
leave policies, between February and April of 1994 to have a lump 
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removed from her lip. See R. at 2-12. In her complaint dated 
September 14, 1994, Cook alleged four causes of action against 
Zions: breach of an express employment contract; breach of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract; breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. R. at 2-12. 
II. COURSE OP THE PROCEEDINGS 
On October 21, 1994, Zions filed a motion for summary 
judgment requesting the district court to summarily dismiss Cook's 
complaint because: (1) she has no express employment contract with 
Zions; (2) Utah law does not recognize a claim for breach of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract outside of the termination 
context, and Cook provides no legal or factual authority for her 
implied contract claim; (3) express disclaimers in Zions' employee 
handbook preclude a breach of employment contract claim in this 
case; (4) Cook's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claim fails because Utah law does not recognize the implied 
covenant in the employment context and because Cook has no 
employment contract with Zions; and (5) Cook's intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by the exclusive 
remedy of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. R. at 62-74, 386-87. 
Prior to responding to Zions' summary judgment motion, 
Cook's counsel served three separate discovery requests on Zions 
and took the depositions of eight fact witnesses. R. at 187-89, 
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228-29-1 On January 23, 1995, Cook f i l ed a memorandum and her 
a f f idav i t in opposition to Zions' summary judgment motion, R. a t 
250-55, 302-66. Zions f i l ed a reply memorandum in support of i t s 
motion on January 27, 1995. R. a t 386-435. 
On February 21, 1995, a f t e r the summary judgment motion 
was completely br iefed, Cook f i l ed a supplemental a f f i dav i t . R. a t 
436-41. In her supplemental a f f idav i t , Cook al leged for the f i r s t 
time tha t a "Potent ial Benefit" of "leave c red i t " for involuntary 
absences from work, as described in a document e n t i t l e d "Employment 
Benefits Disclosure and Pay Agreement" dated July 28, 1988, 
cons t i tu tes an express employment contract between her and Zions. 
R. a t 437-48, 441. 
The d i s t r i c t court heard oral argument on Zions' summary 
judgment motion on March 10, 1995. R. a t 572-97. Following oral 
argument, Cook f i l ed a motion to supplement oral argument or to 
f i l e a supplemental memorandum. R. 446-68. On March 31, 1995, the 
d i s t r i c t court issued a minute entry which s t a t ed : "[S]ince the 
Court des i res to be sure p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel i s s a t i s f i e d tha t oral 
argument has been adequately provided, t h i s Court s e t s a second 
oral argument [on] the defendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment." 
1
 Although the record demonstrates that Cook was provided more than ample 
opportunity to conduct discovery re la ted to the i s sues ra ised by Zions' motion, 
she complains that she "has not been deposed or allowed the opportunity to 
t e s t i f y . " Appel lant's Opening Brief at 40. This complaint overlooks the fact 
that Cook t e s t i f i e d in two a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d in opposit ion to Zions' motion. R. 
at 250-55, 436-41. Also, the lower court allowed Cook to conduct whatever 
discovery was necessary to address Zions' motion and Cook presumably could have 
not iced her own depos i t ion . 
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R. at 458. The second oral argument was held on April 21, 1995, 
after which the district court took Zion's motion under advisement. 
R. at 508-71. 
III. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW 
On June 8, 1995, the district court issued a Memorandum 
Decision granting Zions' motion for summary judgment. R. at 474-
81. On July 14, 1995, consistent with its Memorandum Decision, the 
district court entered its Judgment dismissing Cook's action on the 
merits and with prejudice. R. at 490-92. 
Cook filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 1995. R. at 
496. Cook challenges the district court's decision only with 
respect to her claims for breach of an express employment contract, 
breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract, and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 2. She does not appeal the district court's 
dismissal of her intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim. Id. 
IV. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Cook was hired by Zions in May of 1988 and is still 
employed with Zions. Affidavit of Richard G. Crandall ("Crandall 
Affidavit") 1 3 (R. at 95). 
2. Cook has never had an express employment agreement 
with Zions. Crandall Affidavit 11 4, 5 (R. at 95). Zions does 
not enter into any individual employment agreements with its 
employees and did not do so with respect to Cook. Id. 
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3. Cook claims she has an express employment contract 
with Zions based on the "List of Potential Benefits" section of a 
document entitled "Employment Benefits Disclosure and Pay 
Agreement" dated July 28, 1988 (hereinafter "Employment Benefits 
Disclosure Form") . Supplemental Affidavit of Gina Cook 11 5-8, 
Exhibit A thereto (R. 437-38, 441). 
4. The "List of Potential Benefits" section of this 
document lists 21 potential benefits in which Zions' employees may 
be eligible to enroll:2 
II. List of Potential Benefits 
A. Involuntary Absence from Work (leave 
credit 90-day waiting period) -- 1 
day per month for full-time 
employees; 1 day (8 hours) per 2 
months for those working at least 20 
hours per week. 
B. Long-term Disability (full-time 25 
years old & 1 year service) 
standard plan. 
C. Medical Insurance -- self-funded or 
choice of health maintenance 
organizations where available. 20 
hours per week qualifies for 
employee coverage; 32 hours per week 
for employee-dependent coverage. 
D. Group Term Life Insurance -- 20 
hours per week or 1000 hours per 
year. 
E. Accidental Death & Dismemberment 
Insurance -- 20 hours per week or 
100 hours per year. 
2
 The first section of the document, entitled "Salary Administration, " lists 
Cook's starting rate of pay. Exhibit A to Supplemental Affidavit of Gina Cook 
(R. at 441). Cook does not claim that Zions violated any part of the "Salary 
Administration" section of the document. 
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F. Retirement & Pension Plan -- 1000 
hours per year, 21 years old & 1 
year service. 
G. Stock Plans -- 1000 hours per year, 
21 years old & 1 year service, 
H. Paid Holidays -- compensation for 
normally scheduled number of hours. 
I. Vacation -- compensation for 
normally scheduled number of hours. 
J. Service Charge Exempt -- checking 
account at Zions Bank. 
K. Service Charge Exempt -- travelers 
checks, cashier's checks & gift 
checks at Zions Bank. 
••'.• L. Safe Deposit Box -- rental free at 
Zions Bank. 
M. Reduced rates on Zions Bank 
MasterCard, VISA, company-sponsored 
installment loans and Home Equity 
Credit Line (min. 6 months service) , 
and Mortgage Loans (min. 1 year 
service). 
N. Discount rates on special 
attractions periodically available. 
Inquire at Personnel Department. 
0. Movie Tickets -- discount prices. 
P. Educational Assistance Programs. 
Q. Savings Plans -- automatic 
deductions to Savings Account, IRA & 
Payroll Savings Bonds. 
R. Employee Money Market Plan. 
S. Automatic paycheck deposit to 
personal checking account. 
T. Job Posting Program. 
U. Earned Income Credit. 
V. Upon termination of employment all 
the above-mentioned benefits will be 
forfeited. 
Exhibit A to Supplemental Affidavit of Gina Cook (R. at 441). 
5- The "Potential Benefit" of "leave credit" for 
involuntary absences from work that Cook contends creates an 
express employment contract between her and Zions merely states 
that, after a 90-day waiting period, full-time employees will be 
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eligible to earn one day of paid leave credit per month. Exhibit 
A to Supplemental Affidavit of Gina Cook (R. at 441) . Cook does 
not claim that Zions ever failed to properly accrue her leave 
credit or that Zions ever failed to pay her for an involuntary 
absence from work. Cook acknowledges that Zions applied her 
accumulated short-term absence credit toward a ten and one-half 
week paid leave of absence from May 31, 1994 through August 8, 
1994. Affidavit of Gina Cook 1 24 (R. at 253). 
6. Immediately above Cook's signature, the Employment 
Benefits Disclosure Form provides as follows: 
III. Certification 
The above documents, agreements and 
benefits have been explained to me. I 
understand them and have been given the 
opportunity to enroll in the programs for 
which I am eligible. This Agreement does 
NOT constitute enrollment in the benefit 
programs found in Section II. 
I understand that I have the right to 
terminate my employment at any time and 
the company retains a similar right. 
Exhibit A to Supplement Affidavit of Gina Cook (emphasis added) (R. 
at 441). 
7. In January 1992, Zions issued an employee handbook 
which contains policy guidelines regarding, among other things, 
attendance and involuntary absences from work. Crandall Affidavit 
K 6, Exhibit B thereto (R. at 95, 135-67). 
8. Zions' 1992 employee handbook clearly and 
conspicuously advises employees that they do not have any express 
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or implied contract of employment with Zions, and that the handbook 
supersedes and replaces all other prior employee reference 
material: 
This booklet is not intended to be an 
official policies and procedures manual, nor 
is it intended to create any expressed or 
implied contractual obligations on the part of 
Zions Bancorporation or its employees. 
This booklet supersedes and replaces all 
other prior employees' reference material. 
* * * 
[N]either you, nor we, have entered into 
any contract of employment, express or 
implied. 
Exhibit B to Crandall Affidavit at 3 (R. at 142). 
9. The 1992 employee handbook also states, in the 
"Introduction" section, that the handbook explains in general terms 
Zions' employment guidelines: 
This booklet contains a summary of Zions 
Bancorporation personnel policies, procedures, 
benefits, and other pertinent information 
which should serve as a valuable reference to 
you as an employee of the Company. It 
explains some of the philosophies and beliefs 
of Zions Bancorporation and explains in 
general terms some of our employment 
guidelines. 
Exhibit B to Crandall Affidavit at 3 (emphasis added) (R. at 142). 
10. Regarding leave credit for involuntary absences from 
work, the 1992 employee handbook informs full-time employees that, 
after a 90-day waiting period, they will earn one day of leave 
credit per month for "illness, accident, death in the family, or 
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your wedding . . . ." Exhibit B to Crandall Affidavit at 12 (R. at 
151) . 
11. The 1992 employee handbook states that, unless an 
absence is "unavoidable," supervisory permission must be obtained 
to take time off for personal matters scheduled during working 
hours: 
There may be unavoidable instances when 
employees are late or absent. In such cases 
the employee should contact his or her 
supervisor as soon as possible. 
If it is absolutely impossible to 
schedule an appointment for personal matters 
(medical, dental, etc.) at any other time than 
during working hours, permission for absence 
must be obtained first from your supervisor. 
Exhibit B to Crandall Affidavit at 7 (R. at 146). 
12. In February 1994, Zions issued its 1994 version of 
the employee handbook which, in all respects relevant to this 
action, is exactly the same as the 1992 handbook. See Crandall 
Affidavit 1 6, Exhibit A thereto (R. at 95, 98-134) . Cook 
received a copy of this handbook on April 8, 1994. Crandall 
Affidavit 1 7, Exhibit C thereto (R. at 95, 168). 
13. The 1994 employee handbook contains clear and 
conspicuous contract disclaimers that are identical to those in the 
1992 handbook: 
This booklet is not intended to be an 
official policies and procedures manual, nor 
is it intended to create any expressed or 
implied contractual obligations on the part of 
Zions Bancorporation or its employees. 
223466 1 1 1 
This booklet supersedes and replaces all 
other prior employees' reference material. 
* * • 
[Neither] you, nor we, have entered into 
any contract of employment, express or 
implied. 
Exhibit A to Crandall Affidavit at 4 (R. at 106). 
14. The 1994 handbook, like the 1992 handbook, states 
that it "contains basic policy and procedure guidelines," and 
"explains in general terms some of our employment guidelines." 
Exhibit A to Crandall Affidavit, first non-numbered page and p. 4 
(emphasis added) (R. at 99, 106). 
15. In her affidavit opposing Zions' motion for summary 
judgment, Cook states that her understanding of Zions' sick leave 
policy is confirmed by the 1994 employee handbook. Affidavit of 
Gina Cook 1 6 (R. at 251). The attendance and leave policies in 
the 1994 handbook which Cook relies on are identical to the 
policies in the 1992 handbook. See Exhibit A to Crandall Affidavit 
at 8, 13-14 (R. at 111, 116-17). 
16. The 1994 handbook contains the same attendance 
policy guideline as the 1992 handbook: 
There may be unavoidable instances when 
employees are late or absent. In such cases, 
the employee should contact his or her 
supervisor as soon as possible. 
If it is absolutely impossible to 
schedule an appointment for personal matters 
(medical, dental, etc.) at any other time than 
during working hours, permission for absence 
must be obtained first from your supervisor. 
223466 1 1 2 
Exhibit A to Crandall Affidavit at 8 (R. at 111). 
17. The 1994 employee handbook also duplicates the 1992 
handbook with respect to describing how credit for short-term 
absences may be earned, namely, full-time employees may earn up to 
12 paid days off a year for "illness, accident, death in the 
family, or your wedding. . . . " Exhibit A to Crandall Affidavit at 
13-14 (R. at 116-17). 
18. Richard Crandall, Vice President and Director of 
Human Resources at Zions, explained that Zions' absence and short-
term leave policies give management the discretion to grant or deny 
employee requests for time off from work. Deposition of Richard 
Crandall at 24-25 (R. at 409-10). 
19. Consistent with the attendance guideline set forth 
in the employee handbook, starting in September or October of 1993 
it was the practice in the Electronic Funds Transfer ("EFT") area, 
in which Cook worked, to have employees fill out written requests 
for time off in advance for approval by their immediate supervisor 
(in Cook's case, Pam Kennaley) and the area manager, Gaylene 
Kenney. Deposition of Gaylene Kenney at 65-68 (R. at 415-18). 
This system allowed the EFT area to keep track of vacation/absence 
dates and schedule employees as necessary. Kenney depo. at 65-66 
(R. at 415-16.) 
20. On at least ten occasions between November of 1993 
and May of 1994, Cook filled out written requests for vacation, 
personal time and/or sick leave. Kenney depo. at 68-82 (R. at 418-
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32) . Al l were approved but a request for f i v e days off for a 
family wedding. For example, on a form dated December 29, 1993, 
Cook requests the day of January 14, 1994 off for her "Mom's 80th 
birthday party." I t i s undisputed that Cook's supervisor and 
manager twice approved Cook's wri t ten requests for time off for 
surgery to have the lump removed from her l i p : a January 29, 1994 
request for a one-hour o f f i c e v i s i t on February 1 and an April 21, 
1994 request for a day for outpat ient surgery. Both were approved. 
Kenney depo. at 68-82 (R. at 418-32) . 3 
21 . In s i t u a t i o n s where an absence i s "unavoidable," 
however, the attendance gu ide l ine in the employee handbook 
express ly al lows an employee to simply "contact h i s or her 
supervisor as soon as p o s s i b l e . " Exhibit A to Crandall Af f idav i t 
at 8 (R. at 146) ; see a l s o Crandall depo. at 27-29 (R. at 327, 411-
12) . 
22. Joyce Misdom, the Operations Compliance Off icer at 
Zions, t e s t i f i e d that during a conversation with Cook about the 
lump on her l i p , she t o l d Cook that "if you need to go to the 
doctor, you should go to the doctor" and that Cook should simply 
"make an appointment and phone in s i c k . " Misdom depo. at 13 (R. at 
3
 Cook contends that in February, March and Apri l , she made an undetermined 
number of addit ional oral requests to mcinager Gaylene Kenney for time off to 
schedule surgery and that Kenney denied her permission. Appel lant 's Opening 
Brief at 10 Facts HH 35, 36. Kenney emphatically denies that Cook made such 
verbal requests and denies that she ever denied any such reques ts . Kenney depo. 
at 85-86 (R. at 433-34) . Although Cook's a l l e g a t i o n i s assumed t o be true for 
purposes of Zions' motion for summary judgment, i t i s immaterial for the reasons 
discussed in Sect ion I hereof, in fra . 
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343) . Misdom also spec i f i ca l ly to ld Cook tha t i f she would make an 
appointment and ca l l in s ick, Cook's supervisor, Gaylene Kenney, 
"wouldn't f i r e you." Misdom depo. a t 14 (pages 13 and 14 of the 
Misdom deposit ion are attached hereto as Exhibit A).4 
23. Richard Crandall s imi la r ly t e s t i f i e d tha t i f an 
employee were in the hospi ta l for a scheduled medical procedure and 
she cal led her supervisor saying she was not coming to work, as 
opposed to receiving p r io r approval, tha t employee would not be 
subject to any d i s c i p l i n e . Crandall depo a t 27-29 (R. a t 327, 411-
12) . In such a s i t ua t i on d i sc ip l ina ry act ion would not be 
administered because, as Crandall t e s t i f i e d , " [ t ] h a t ' s an i l l n e s s 
if i t was for surgery." Crandall depo. a t 29 (R. a t 327). 
24. Zions does not d i s t r i b u t e any other statements of 
pol icy or procedure guidel ines to i t s employees aside from the 
employee handbook. Crandall Affidavit 1 8 (R. a t 95) . Cook 
attempts to dispute t h i s fact by relying on a statement published 
in the company newslet ter , "Newsbreak," dated September 20, 1994. 
Appel lant ' s Opening Brief a t 8, Facts 1t 23-25. The publ ica t ion i s 
s ty led as a "news update" and contained the following statement: 
4
 Cook r e l i e s exc lus ive ly on page 13 of the Misdom deposi t ion for her claim 
that she subjec t ive ly feared she would be f i red i f she took one day off without 
Kenney's prior approval. Appel lant's Opening Brief at 8, Facts U 37. On the 
very next page of t h i s deposi t ion, however, Misdom t e s t i f i e d she s p e c i f i c a l l y 
to ld Cook that Kenney "wouldn't f i r e you." Misdom depo. at 14. Zions did not 
include page 14 of the Misdom deposit ion as part of the record in the d i s t r i c t 
court because Cook did not ra i se the "subjective fear" argument in her Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 302-
20) ; Transcript of Summary Judgment Argument dated April 21,1995 at 36-37 (R. at 
543-44) . 
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"Zions policies provide employees with adequate time to seek needed 
medical treatment." This edition of "Newsbreak" was published 
after Cook filed the lawsuit. As explained by Zions' President, 
Harris Simmons: 
We had received a number of inquiries 
about the lawsuit in that it had been reported 
to the media and we had customers asking 
employees and employees asking managers about 
the case and we felt that it was important 
that employees generally understood what our 
position was. 
Deposition of Harris H. Simmons at 19 (R. at 435) . Simmons 
testified that the statement accurately reflects the Zions' 
position in this lawsuit. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In her opening brief, Cook repeatedly characterizes her 
claim as one for breach of a "contract for compensation which 
included paid sick leave." However, Cook does not claim that she 
failed to receive the appropriate amount of paid leave credit or 
that she has not been fully compensated for her accrued sick leave. 
Instead, Cook contends that Zions, by simply providing its 
employees with paid sick leave,5 entered into a binding contract 
with her giving her the right to request and receive sick leave 
when needed. Cook claims that the manager of the area in which she 
works breached this alleged contract by delaying approval for a 
paid day off for a medical procedure. She alleges, without any 
5
 Other "unpaid" leave is also available to Zions' employees. 
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factual support, tha t t h i s delay caused the progression of her 
medical condition and the loss of any opportunity to prevent tha t 
condit ion. In shor t , Cook i s attempting to transform Zions' "leave 
c red i t " policy in to a contract requir ing Zions to know or foresee 
how "needed" a medical appointment or procedure i s , and to insure 
the consequences of any delay in scheduling a planned absence,6 
As the source of her al leged express employment contract , 
Cook r e l i e s on the "potent ia l benefi t" of "leave c red i t " for 
involuntary absences from work, as described in the 1988 Employment 
Benefits Disclosure Form. This statement merely advises fu l l - t ime 
employees they wi l l be e l i g i b l e to earn one day of leave c red i t per 
month. I t does not create any obl igat ion or promise regarding the 
use of such leave c r e d i t . Moreover, the document on which Cook 
r e l i e s expressly s t a t e s tha t i t "does not cons t i tu t e enrollment in 
the benefi t programs found in Section I I . " Even if Cook were able 
to e s t ab l i sh tha t t h i s document i s a binding wr i t ten employment 
contract , Zions did not breach i t because Zions never accrued 
Cook's leave c red i t a t any amount l e s s than one day per month and 
ful ly paid her for her accrued leave c r e d i t . 
Cook a lso provides no author i ty for her impl ied- in-fact 
contract claim. Utah law does not recognize a claim for breach of 
6
 During oral argument, the d i s t r i c t court s ta ted as fo l lows regarding 
Cook's claim: "So, you're saying that whenever an employer says , we're busy in 
t h i s department; I would rather you didn't take time off for t h i s surgery now. 
That employer assumes l i a b i l i t y for the consequential damages that ne i ther know 
about, in terms of l a t e r discovered t rag ic medical circumstances. Transcript of 
Summary Judgment Argument dated April 21, 1995 at 22 (R. at 529) . 
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an implied-in-fact employment contract based on an employer's 
alleged delay in allowing an employee to take time off pursuant to 
a paid sick leave policy. Utah courts have never indicated an 
intention to extend the implied-in-fact employment contract 
exception to the at-will rule, created in Berube v. Fashion Centre. 
Ltd. , 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), to aspects of the employment 
relationship beyond termination. Cook's implied contract claim is 
also defective because the facts she relies on to support the 
alleged contract, including the "when needed" term she adds to 
Zions' leave credit policy, are too indefinite to provide a basis 
for determining its terms, the existence of a breach and resulting 
damages. Finally, Cook's implied contract claim fails because 
Zions clearly and conspicuously disclaimed any contractual intent. 
Zions' 1992 and 1994 handbooks both state that the handbook 
"supersedes and replaces all other prior employees' reference 
material" and that neither party has "entered into any contract of 
employment, express or implied." 
Cook has also failed to provide any support for her 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, 
which has not been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
employment context. In direct contravention of well-established 
Utah case law, Cook attempts to use the implied covenant of good 
faith to create a "new and independent right, " which was not agreed 
upon by the parties, to hold Zions' supervisors responsible for 
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knowing when and how soon employees should use t h e i r paid sick 
leave. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF ZIONS. 
As s ta ted by t h i s Court in Schafir v. Harricran. 879 P.2d 
1384 (Utah App. 1994), "*the p la in language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, a f t e r adequate time for discovery 
and upon motion, against a par ty who f a i l s to make a showing 
suf f ic ien t to e s t ab l i sh the existence of an element e s sen t i a l to 
tha t p a r t y ' s case and on which tha t par ty wi l l bear the burden of 
proof a t t r i a l . ' " Id. a t 1391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Ca t re t t , 
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)) . In such a s i t u a t i o n , the non-moving 
party cannot avoid summary judgment by asse r t ing a disputed issue 
of mater ia l fact " ' s ince a complete f a i lu re of proof concerning an 
e s sen t i a l element of the non-moving p a r t y ' s case renders a l l other 
facts immater ia l . ' " Schafir . 879 P.2d a t 1391 (quoting Celotex, 
477 U.S. a t 323) .7 
To successfully challenge Zion's motion for summary 
judgment in the present case, Cook must therefore present 
suf f ic ien t evidence in speci f ic factual form tha t i s mater ial to 
the question of whether she and Zions entered in to an express or 
7
 Although Cook characterizes summary judgment as "drast ic ," the United 
States Supreme Court in Celotex s tated , "Summary judgment procedure i s properly 
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part 
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the j u s t , speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every act ion ." Celotex. 477 U.S. at 327. 
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implied employment contract that (1) requires Zions' supervisors to 
foresee the "need" of a medical appointment or procedures and 
insure the consequences of any delay in scheduling planned 
absences; and (2) completely eliminates the issue of whether Cook 
could have, pursuant to Zions1 attendance policy, scheduled the in-
hospital surgery and then called her supervisor from the hospital 
to advise her of the same. Cook failed to meet that burden, and 
she should not be able to withstand summary judgment on the mere 
expectation that she will be able to develop the requisite evidence 
at some later date. See, e.g.. Paddington Ptrns. v. Bouchard. 34 
F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1994) ("In a summary judgment context, an 
opposing party's mere hope that further evidence may develop prior 
to trial is an insufficient basis upon which to justify the denial 
of a summary judgment motion.") (quoting Gray v. Town of Darien. 
927 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1992)); Conway v. Smith. 853 F.2d 784, 793 
(10th Cir. 1988) ("In response to a motion for summary judgment, a 
party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on 
suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope 
that something will turn up at trial."). 
Cook also cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on 
factual disputes that are immaterial to the outcome of Zions' 
motion. As this Court recently stated, "only material issues of 
fact preclude summary judgment . . . x[T]he mere existence of 
genuine issues of fact . . . does not preclude the entry of summary 
judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the 
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case.'" Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
App. 1994) (emphasis in original) (quoting Morgan v. Industrial 
Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 751 (Utah 1982)). 
Although there is a factual dispute as to whether Cook 
verbally requested and was denied time off between February and 
April of 1994, that issue is not material for several reasons. 
First, Cook has failed to show that Zions entered into and breached 
any express or implied employment contract, let alone a contract 
that holds Zions' supervisors responsible for the unforeseeable 
effects of any delay in obtaining paid time off.8 The extensive 
evidence cited by Cook regarding the fact that Zions provides paid 
sick leave to its employees and its reasons for doing so is 
immaterial to that issue. Cook's claim is not for paid sick leave 
and, even if it were, there is no evidence that Zions ever failed 
to properly accrue her leave credit or pay her for a sick leave as 
accrued. 
Second, Cook has not controverted the undisputed evidence 
submitted by Zions that she could have, pursuant to Zions' 
attendance guideline, scheduled the surgery and then called her 
supervisor. Cook's "subjective fear" that she would have been 
fired is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The evidence 
remains uncontroverted that Cook was specifically told by Joyce 
8
 To establish the existence of such a contract, Cook must show more than 
her "subjective understandings or expectations." See Rose v. Allied Dev. Co.. 
719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986). 
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Misdom that her supervisor "wouldn't fire you" and that Cook would 
not have been subject to any discipline, much less termination, if 
she had taken such a course of action. Material Facts 11 22, 23. 
In sum, the district court's decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of Zions should be affirmed because Cook has 
failed to come forward with sufficient facts showing essential 
elements of her case, and because the alleged factual disputes she 
relies on are immaterial to any issue raised by Zions' motion. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT COOK HAS NO 
EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH ZIONS. 
A. Cook Failed to Establish the Elements of an Express 
Employment Contract. 
The district court dismissed Cook's breach of express 
employment contract claim "because there is no employment contract 
between the parties." Memorandum Decision at 5 (R. at 478) . Cook 
contends that the district court erred because the "Potential 
Benefit" of "leave credit" for involuntary absences from work, as 
described in the 1988 Employment Benefits Disclosure Form, creates 
an express employment contract between her and Zions that gave her 
the right "to request and receive earned sick leave when needed." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, 24, 27 (emphasis added). In other 
words, Cook claims that Zions, by distributing the Employment 
Benefits Disclosure Form describing how employees earn paid sick 
leave, intended to obligate its supervisors to foresee how "needed" 
a medical appointment or procedure is and to insure the 
consequences of any delay in scheduling planned absences* 
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The 1988 Employment Benefits Disclosure Form cannot 
reasonably be construed to be an employment agreement- The f i r s t 
sect ion of the document, e n t i t l e d "Salary Administrat ion," l i s t s 
the employee's r a t e and method of pay. The sect ion on the bottom 
of the form, e n t i t l e d "List of Potent ia l Benef i t s ," merely 
describes 21 Potential Benefits, ranging from reduced r a t e s on a 
Mastercard to movie t i c k e t s . Material Facts 1 4. Cook's breach of 
express employment contract claim i s based e n t i r e l y on the "List of 
Potent ia l Benefits" sect ion of the document. Cook does not claim 
tha t Zions v io la ted the "Salary Administration" sec t ion , which i s 
obviously the "Pay Agreement" por t ion of the document. 
Zions ce r t a in ly did not express the in ten t to 
cont rac tual ly obl igate i t s e l f , for an unlimited period of time, to 
provide each and every one of the 21 "Potent ial Benefits" described 
in the Employment Benefits Disclosure Form. Immediately above 
Cook's s ignature , the document c lea r ly and conspicuously s t a t e s 
tha t i t "does NOT constitute enrollment in the benefit programs 
found in Section II ," the very place to which Cook points to bind 
Zions to an employment agreement. Material Facts 1 5 (emphasis 
added) .9 
9
 If Cook's express contract theory i s accepted, a l l employees who received 
t h i s form, regardless of the i r enrollment in the benef i t programs, would have a 
claim for breach of contract i f Zions ever f a i l e d to provide them with such items 
as service charge exemptions, free safe ty deposit boxes, reduced rates on credi t 
cards and loans, discount rates on spec ia l a t t r a c t i o n s , discounted movie t i c k e t s , 
educational ass i s tance programs, savings plans, and automatic paycheck deposi ts 
in checking accounts. See Material Facts f 4 . 
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Furthermore, the plain language of the statement that 
Cook relies on provides noting more than the right to earn one day 
of leave credit per month: 
Involuntary Absence from Work (leave credit 
90-day waiting period) -- 1-day per month for 
full-time employees; 1-day (8 hours) for two 
months for those working at least 20 hours per 
week. 
Material Facts 1 4. The only "promise," if any, that could 
reasonably be derived from this statement is that, after a 90-day 
waiting period, Cook would be eligible to accrue leave credit at 
the rate of "one day per month." It does not tie the element of 
being paid for involuntary absences to any other obligation on the 
part of Zions, especially an obligation by Zions' supervisors to 
make a medically optimal decision on scheduling an employee's 
medical appointments and treatment. Cook asks this Court to 
rewrite Zions' leave credit policy to include a "when needed" 
contract term and then to define it in her favor. See Robertson 
v. Utah Fuel Co.. 889 P.2d 1382, 1385-86 (Utah App. 1995) 
(substance abuse policy in employee handbook stating that employees 
who voluntarily come forward for treatment would be offered 
rehabilitation assistance did not create "contract term that 
[plaintiff] would not be demoted, terminated, or otherwise 
disciplined for voluntarily coming forward to seek treatment for 
his substance abuse problem."). 
In sum, because Cook has failed to carry her burden of 
establishing that the "Potential Benefit" of "leave credit" for 
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involuntary absences from work meets the elements of an express 
contract, the district court's dismissal of her breach of express 
employment contract claim should be affirmed. 
B• Even if Cook Were Able to Establish that the Employment 
Benefits Disclosure Form is a Binding Written Employment 
Contract, Zions did not Breach the Alleged Contract. 
If for some reason the Employment Benefits Disclosure 
Form were deemed to be an express employment contract, then the 
provisions of that document alone would govern Cook's rights with 
respect to leave credit for involuntary absences. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "[a]n express agreement or covenant relating to 
a specific contract right excludes the possibility of an implied 
covenant of a different or contradictory nature." Rio Alaom Corp. 
v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); see also Berube v. 
Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (n[a]n 
implied-in-fact promise cannot, of course, contradict a written 
contract term."); Barber v. SMH(US) . Inc. . 202 Mich. App. 366, 509 
N.W.2d 791, 796 (1994) ("a contract will be implied only if there 
is no express contract covering the same subject matter.11). 
The statement on the Employment Benefits Disclosure Form 
regarding "leave credit" for involuntary absences from work simply 
describes how employees may accrue such leave credit -- one day per 
month after a 90-day waiting period. Thus, assuming the existence 
of an express contract based on this statement, there would be no 
breach by Zions because, as Cook does not dispute, Zions never 
accrued her leave credit at any amount less than one day per month. 
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In addi t ion , if, as Cook urges, the Employment Benefits Disclosure 
Form expressly provided tha t she had the r igh t to request and 
receive sick leave "when needed, lf Cook could have taken the time 
off without Zions' approval and there would be no breach u n t i l she 
did so and Zions fa i l ed to pay her.10 
In sum, assuming the Employment Benefits Disclosure Form 
i s an express employment cont rac t , i t alone i s con t ro l l ing and 
Zions did not breach the a l leged cont rac t . Accordingly, the 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s decision dismissing Cook's breach of express 
employment contract claim should be affirmed. 
I I I . THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT COOK'S IMPLIED-IN -
PACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT THEORY I S NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER UTAH 
LAW. 
Cook's impl ied- in-fact employment contract theory i s a 
novel one. Cook has not been terminated and i s not claiming tha t 
Zions breached an impl ied- in-fact contract tha t she could only be 
terminated for cause. Nor does she claim tha t Zions breached an 
implied agreement to pay her accumulated s ick leave . Instead, Cook 
argues tha t Zions, by providing paid s ick leave to i t s employees, 
entered in to an impl ied- in-fac t employment contract with her tha t 
obligated Zions' supervisors and managers to p red ic t how "needed" 
10
 As the d i s t r i c t court s ta ted during oral argument, "The breach comes 
when they refuse to pay her, because they've sa id she couldn't be paid. . . [H] ow 
i s there a breach of t h i s provis ion u n t i l they say we refuse t o pay you? You've 
taken the time, now we refuse to pay you for that time." Transcript of Summary 
Judgment Hearing dated April 21, 1995 at 10 (R. at 517) . 
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a medical appointment or procedure i s and to insure the 
consequences of any delay in scheduling planned paid absences. 
Cook c i t e s no au thor i ty , Utah or otherwise, in support of 
an implied-in-fact employment contract which involves an employer's 
al leged delay in allowing an employee to take time off pursuant to 
a s ick leave pol icy . The Utah cases applying the implied- in-fact 
employment contract cause of ac t ion, from Berube v. Fashion Centre. 
Ltd. , 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1988) to Hamilton v. Parkdale Care 
Center. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1995), a l l involve claims 
re la ted to employment termination.1 1 Because Utah law does not 
recognize an implied- in-fact employment contract cause of ac t ion 
outside the termination context, the d i s t r i c t court cor rec t ly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Zions. 
A review of the h i s t o r i c a l development of the cause of 
act ion for breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract under 
Utah law i s helpful in understanding why discharge i s an e s sen t i a l 
element of the claim. The Utah Supreme Court f i r s t recognized the 
11
 By characterizing her claim as one for breach of a "compensation 
agreement," Cook attempts to f i t her case within the parameters of Piston v. 
Envirooak Medical Prods.. 893 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1995) , rather than Berube and 
i t s progeny. Piston involved an oral compensation agreement evidenced by a 
"Letter of Intent" in which the defendant s p e c i f i c a l l y agreed t o h ire and pay the 
p l a i n t i f f an annual salary of $72,000 for three years . Id. at 1075. Cook's 
re l iance on Piston i s misplaced because the p l a i n t i f f Pis ton, unlike Cook, never 
was an employee of the defendant, because Cook, despite s e l f - s t y l i n g her claim 
as one for breach of a "compensation contract ," does not claim that Zions ever 
f a i l e d to pay her compensation owed pursuant to the terms of any contract and 
because both p a r t i e s in Piston t e s t i f i e d "they had reached an agreement." Id. 
Moreover, as discussed in Section IV hereof infra . Piston supports Zions' 
p o s i t i o n that Cook's a l l eged contract i s unenforceable because the a l l eged r ights 
and ob l igat ions of the par t i e s are too inde f in i t e to provide a bas i s for 
determining i t s terms, the ex is tence of a breach and resu l t ing damages. 
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existence of impl ied- in-fact employment cont rac ts in Berube, which 
involved an ac t ion for wrongful termination brought by a former 
employee. Relying upon the wel l -es tab l i shed ru le tha t employment 
i s a t - w i l l , the d i s t r i c t court dismissed the case. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding tha t there i s a l imi ted contractual 
exception to the a t - w i l l ru le where an "implied contractual term 
se t s for th a period of durat ion or l im i t s dismissal to cause 
a lone ." Berube. 771 P.2d a t 1047 (emphasis added). As crafted by 
Berube, the implied contract exception c l ea r ly requi res the element 
of discharge. In h i s concurring opinion, J u s t i c e Zimmerman ca l led 
for caution in crea t ing exceptions to the a t - w i l l r u l e : 
Because the law in t h i s area i s in a s t a t e of 
f lux, and because the a t - w i l l doctr ine has 
become well entrenched in our law and any 
change in i t has the po t en t i a l to af fect the 
p rac t i ces of almost every employer in Utah, we 
must proceed with care in recognizing 
exceptions to tha t doc t r ine . 
Berube, 771 P.2d a t 1050. 
In every case since Berube involving disputes between 
employees and t h e i r employers, Utah appe l la te courts have applied 
the impl ied- in-fact exception in the context of a discharge.1 2 
12
 See Caldwell v . Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah. I n c . , 777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
1989) (" [A] majority of the Berube Court concluded that an employer's i n t e r n a l l y 
adopted p o l i c i e s and procedures concerning discharge can . . . become part of the 
contractual re la t ionsh ip between the employer and the employee.") (emphasis 
added) ; Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., I n c . . 779 P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989) 
(" [T] he discharged employee may have a claim for breach of contract i f the 
employer discharges the employee without complying with the terms of the 
agreement under which the employee worked.") (emphasis added); Brehanv v . 
Nordstrom, Inc. . 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991) (" [E]mployment manuals and company 
p o l i c y statements concerning the terms of employment may provide terms that l i m i t 
(cont inued. . . ) 
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Likewise, the courts in these cases have cons is ten t ly character ized 
the exception as one l imi t ing an employer's r igh t to discharge, not 
one l imi t ing any other aspect of the employment r e l a t i onsh ip . In 
short , the exception for implied- in-fact employee contracts has 
only been recognized in discharge cases . 
In Zions' reply memorandum in support of i t s summary 
judgment motion, Zions noted tha t Michigan and California courts 
had considered the existence of implied contract claims outside of 
the discharge context and both had expressly refused to permit an 
employee to maintain such a cause of ac t ion . Since the d i s t r i c t 
court entered i t s Memorandum Decision, however, the California 
Supreme Court, in Scott v. Pacif ic Gas & Elec. Co.. 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 
427, 904 P.2d 834 (1995), ruled tha t two workers could sue t h e i r 
employer for demotions in v io la t ion of company d i sc ip l ina ry r u l e s . 
The Scott case involved the demotion of two PG&E supervisors for 
poor supervision, conf l ic t of i n t e r e s t and fabr ica t ion of t h e i r 
12
 (. . . continued) 
an employer's absolute r ight to discharge for any or no reason.") (emphasis 
added); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, I n c . . 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991) ("[I]f 
the evidence presented i s such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
par t i e s agreed to l imi t the employer's r ight to terminate the employee, i t i s 
appropriate for a court to decide the i s sue as a matter of law.") (emphasis 
added); Kirberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah App. 1994) ( f f[I]f the 
evidence i s such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the p a r t i e s agreed 
to l imi t the employer's r ight to terminate the employee, then the i s sue i s one 
of law and appropriate for summary judgment.") (emphasis added); Robertson v. 
Utah Fuel Co.. 889 P.2d 1382, 1384-87 (Utah App. 1995) (substance abuse po l i cy 
in handbook did not change a t - w i l l s ta tus of employee who "refused to accept the 
demotion and was therefore terminated."); Hamilton v . Parkdale Care Center. 275 
Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 34 (Utah App. 1995) ("Hamilton claims Parkdale's progressive 
d i s c i p l i n e p o l i c y modified her a t - w i l l employment re la t ionsh ip and created an 
impl ied- in- fact contract term that Hamilton would not be terminated without f i r s t 
being given the benef i t of t h i s d i sc ip l inary procedure.") (emphasis added). 
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annual ethics questionnaire at a time when the company had an 
established disciplinary policy termed "Positive Discipline," 
calling for coaching and counseling before taking disciplinary 
action against workers, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d at 430. The court held 
that the plaintiffs had a contractual right to the "positive 
discipline" process outlined in PG&E's policy manual before being 
demoted. Id. at 433. 
In contrast to allegations in the present case, Scott 
involved an adverse employment action -- a demotion. The Scott 
court also noted that, unlike Cook's alleged "when needed" 
contract, PG&E's "rules and procedures were sufficiently clear to 
permit a trier-of-fact to determine whether the company had 
complied with them." Id. at 434. Finally, the Scott court 
reserved the right of California courts to continue to ignore 
"vague promises about the terms and conditions of employment that 
provide no definable standards for constraining an employer's 
inherent authority to manage its enterprise" and noted that "many 
alleged employer promises will be unable to cross this threshold of 
definition to become enforceable contract claims." Id. at 438. 
Less confident in their ability to control litigation 
associated with the creation of a new cause of action, the courts 
of Michigan, the only jurisdiction other than California to have 
considered this issue, have refused to extend implied contract 
claims outside of the termination context. In Toussaint v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the Michigan 
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Supreme Court became one of the f i r s t courts in the country to 
recognize an exception to the a t - w i l l r u l e . Eleven years l a t e r , in 
Dumas v. Auto Club Insurance Association. 473 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. 
1991), the Michigan Supreme Court refused to extend the Toussaint 
exception to compensation i s sues : 
In addi t ion to the lack of precedent 
extending Toussaint to facts s imi lar to those 
presented here, pol icy considerat ions are in 
favor of containing Toussaint to the wrongful 
discharge scenar io . Were we to extend the 
legi t imate-expecta t ions claim to every area 
governed by company pol icy, then each time a 
pol icy change took place contract r i gh t s would 
be cal led in to question. The fear of courting 
l i t i g a t i o n would r e s u l t in a subs tan t i a l 
impairment of a company's operations and in 
i t s a b i l i t y to formulate pol icy . 
473 N.W.2d a t 656. See a lso Baragar v. Sta te Farm. 860 F. Supp. 
1257, 1262 (W.D. Mich. 1994) ( re ject ing claim for wrongful 
demotion: "The same policy considerat ions tha t prevented the 
extension in Dumas would prevent the extension here . We l i v e in a 
very competitive age where being able to make quick management 
decisions and adjustments often determines the f a i l u re or success 
of a business . Therefore, absent a c lear statement from the 
Michigan Supreme Court, t h i s court concludes tha t i t should not 
extend . . . Toussaint to 'wrongful demotion.'11).13 
13
 Cf. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, I n c . . 10 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. 
(BNA) 72 (111. 1994) (refusing to extend tort of r e t a l i a t o r y discharge to 
demotion cases : "In our view, adoption of p l a i n t i f f ' s argument would replace the 
well-developed element of discharge with a new, i l l - d e f i n e d , and p o t e n t i a l l y a l l -
encompassing concept of r e t a l i a t o r y conduct or discr iminat ion. The courts then 
would be c a l l e d upon to become increas ingly involved in the reso lut ion of 
(continued. . .) 
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The Michigan decisions express both the legal and 
practical concerns about extending the doctrine of implied-in-fact 
contracts to non-termination cases. The table of contents in 
Zions' employee handbook demonstrates the range of issues in which 
the courts could become involved if Cook's theory is accepted. The 
handbook addresses a broad range of issues, including outside 
employment, personal finances, participation in community affairs, 
pay days, compensation, salary increases, hours of work, overtime 
pay, salary deductions, personal appearance, personal telephone 
calls and visits, job posting program, education assistance, 
military leave, jury duty, and benefits. See Exhibit A to Crandall 
Affidavit (R. at 98-134) . The Utah Supreme Court has never 
indicated an intention to extend the implied-in-fact employment 
contract cause of action created in Berube to such a broad range of 
day-to-day aspects of the employment relationship. Moreover, many 
of the issues addressed by Zions' policies are regulated by statute 
(such as jury duty and overtime compensation) . This suggests that 
regulation of non-termination issues is best left to the 
legislature. 
In sum, Cook asks this Court to extend the implied-in-
fact contract exception beyond the boundaries specifically 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Berube and its progeny. 
13
 (. . . continued) 
workplace disputes which center on employer conduct that heretofore has not been 
actionable at common law or by statute.") 
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As the Michigan courts have held, such an extension should be 
rejected because it will lead to a significant intrusion in the 
employer-employee relationship. In any event, employer obligations 
based on alleged contract terms created by employees are not the 
place to start development of new theories of employment law. 
Accordingly, the district court's decision dismissing Cook's 
implied contract claim should be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED COOK'S IMPLIED 
CONTRACT CLAIM FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASON THAT SHE FAILED TO 
PROVIDE ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE CLAIM. 
As best as can be discerned from Cook's opening brief, it 
appears that, in addition to the Employment Benefits Disclosure 
Form, Cook is relying on the following facts to support her claim 
for breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract: (1) Zions' 
practice and policy of providing paid sick leave pursuant to which 
she has accumulated hours of leave credit over the years; (2) the 
fact that Zions provides paid sick leave to be competitive and to 
enhance the health of its workforce; (3) a statement published in 
the company newsletter, "Newsbreak" dated September 20, 1994, that 
"Zions' policies provide employees with adequate time to seek 
needed medical treatment"; and (4) Zions' policy of requiring 
employees to obtain supervisory permission to take time off for 
personal matters scheduled during working hours. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 7-9, 15-17, 24-27. What Cook does not explain, 
however, is how these facts constitute an offer by Zions to foresee 
and insure the consequences of any risks associated with an 
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employee's delay in obtaining medical treatment. As demonstrated 
below, Cook's evidence is much too vague and indefinite to be 
enforceable as such a contract. 
" [F]or an implied in fact contract term to exist, it must 
meet the requirements for an offer of an unilateral contract, " 
requiring "a manifestation of the employer's intent that is 
communicated to an employee and sufficiently definite to operate as 
a contract provision" such that "the employee can reasonably 
believe that the employer is making [such] an offer of employment 
. . ." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. 818 P.2d at 997, 1001 (Utah 
1992) ; see also Robertson. 889 P.2d at 1387; Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 
1145; Kirberg, 872 P.2d at 41, Hodgson. 844 P.2d at 334; Sanderson. 
844 P.2d at 307. The fact that Zions provides paid sick leave to 
its employees and its reasons for doing so does not in any way 
establish an intention on behalf of Zions to offer Cook a contract 
holding Zion's supervisors responsible for knowing or foreseeing 
how "needed" a medical appointment or procedure is and insuring the 
consequences of any delay in scheduling planned paid absences 
during working hours. See Robertson. 889 P.2d at 1385-88. 
Relying on this Court's recent decision in Piston. 893 
P.2d 1071, Cook argues that her alleged implied-in-fact contract is 
"sufficiently definite" enough to be enforced. Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 23-24. Piston does not support Cook's argument, however. 
The plaintiff Piston sought to enforce a contract providing for (1) 
an annual salary of $72,000 for three years, (2) a $360 monthly car 
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allowance, (2) participation in the company's stock option plan, 
(3) participation in the company's incentive compensation program, 
(4) health and accident insurance, (5) reimbursement for business 
expenses, and (6) two weeks paid vacation. Piston. 893 P.2d at 
1073-74, 1078. The only terms of the agreement the Court enforced 
were the $72,000 annual salary and the $360 monthly car allowance, 
holding that the additional compensation terms "too indefinite to 
be enforced." Id. at 1076 n.l, 1078. Regarding the requirement of 
sufficient definiteness, the Court stated: 
The requirement that a contract be 
sufficiently definite is a functional 
requirement from the parties' perspective in 
terms of whether it can be performed, and the 
court's perspective in terms of whether it can 
be enforced. See Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 
83, 86, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962) ("[A] 
contract can be enforced by the courts only if 
the obligations of the parties are set forth 
with sufficient definiteness that it can be 
performed."); Restatement (Second) of Contract 
§ 33 (1979) ("The terms of a contract are 
reasonably certain if they can provide a basis 
for determining the existence of a breach and 
for giving an appropriate remedy."). 
Id. at 1075-76. 
Cook's alleged contract terms, requiring Zions' 
management to foresee the "need" of a medical appointment and 
holding Zions responsible for the consequences of any delay in 
scheduling a planned paid absence, are far more indefinite than the 
unenforceable terms in Piston. Despite Cook's allegation to the 
contrary, there is no evidence in the record that "what was 
bargained for and agreed by the parties was the ability to receive 
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sick leave when needed." See Appellant's Opening Brief at 27 
(emphasis added). The facts Cook relies on to support this 
allegation show nothing more than Zions' undertaking to "pay" sick 
leave compensation to Cook. 
Cook's alleged implied contract is also too indefinite to 
determine the existence of a breach. A "when needed" standard, as 
applied to Zions' supervisors adjudging the medical needs of 
employees, is so indefinite as to make it impossible to determine 
whether Zions complied with it. Moreover, as noted above, if 
Cook's alleged implied contract were a "compensation agreement," as 
she characterizes it on appeal, there would be no breach by Zions 
until she took a day off and Zions refused to pay her. 
Zions also did not breach the alleged contract because it 
is undisputed that Cook could have scheduled the in-hospital 
surgery and then called her supervisor to advise her of that fact. 
Material Facts 11 21-23. The attendance guideline in the employee 
handbook expressly allows an employee, in situations where an 
absence is "unavoidable," to simply "contact his or her supervisor 
as soon as possible." Material Facts 1 21. 
Cook argues that she subjectively "feared" she would be 
fired if she took one day off without the prior approval of her 
supervisor, Gaylene Kenney. Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, Facts 
1 37. However, Cook does not rely on specific documentation, oral 
representations, or examples of other employees who have been 
terminated to support her subjective belief that she would have 
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been fired. Instead, she relies exclusively on the deposition 
testimony of Joyce Misdom, the Operations Compliance Officer at 
Zions. See id. What Cook does not tell the Court, however, is 
that Misdom specifically told her that she should "make an 
appointment and phone in sick, " and that if she did so, Kenney 
"wouldn't fire you." Misdom depo. at 13-14 (attached as Exhibit A 
hereto). Cook's subjective "fear" is insufficient to controvert 
the evidence submitted by Zions that she would not be subject to 
any discipline, much less termination, for scheduling the medical 
procedure and simply calling her supervisor from the hospital to 
advise her she was not coming to work. See Robertson. 889 P.2d at 
1388 n.4 ("'Unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions' are 
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.") (quoting 
Treloaaan v. Treloaaan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985)). 
Even if Cook could establish the existence and breach of 
an implied-in-fact employment contract, her claim is still 
defective because she has failed to prove, with sufficient 
definiteness, entitlement to any "appropriate remedy." See Piston. 
893 P.2d at 1076. The "sick leave" cases cited on page 19 of 
Cook's opening brief do not help Cook because, unlike the 
plaintiffs in each of those cases, Cook is not seeking to recover 
unpaid accrued sick leave compensation. Despite not appealing the 
dismissal of her tort claim, Cook is still asserting entitlement to 
tort-based damages based on the contention that Zions' delay in 
allowing her time off work caused "a critical and significant delay 
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in her cancer treatment, resulting in the progression in the cancer 
and the loss of any opportunities to prevent that progression." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 12. Cook provides no factual support 
for this allegation and offers no evidence that such damages are 
susceptible to reasonable computation or that they were "reasonably 
within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the 
parties at the time the contract was made." See Berube. 771 P.2d 
at 1050 (emphasis added).14 Because Cook has presented no evidence 
regarding the damages she seeks to recover, there is no basis for 
determining her entitlement to an "appropriate remedy." 
In sum, Cook's implied-in-fact contract is unenforceable 
because the alleged rights and obligations of the parties are too 
indefinite to provide a basis for determining its terms, the 
existence of a breach, and resulting damages that were contemplated 
by the parties at the time the alleged contract was made. 
V. COOK'S IMPLIED CONTRACT CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE ZIONS CLEARLY AND 
CONSPICUOUSLY DISCLAIMED ANY CONTRACTUAL INTENT. 
Cook's implied-in-fact employment contract claim also 
fails because Zions clearly and conspicuously disclaimed any 
contractual intent. Zions' 1994 employee handbook, which Cook 
relies on as a source of her alleged implied contract terms, 
clearly and conspicuously advises employees that they do not have 
14
 Cook obviously cannot rely on the edition of "Newsbreak" published in 
September 1994, after she filed this case, to argue that the parties reasonably 
contemplated such damages "at the time the [alleged] contract was made." See 
Berube. 771 P.2d at 1050. 
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any express or implied contract of employment with Zions, and that 
the handbook supersedes and replaces all other prior employees 
reference material: 
This booklet is not intended to be an 
official policies and procedures manual, nor 
is it intended to create any expressed or 
implied contractual obligations on the part of 
Zions Bancorporation or its employees. 
This booklet supersedes and replaces all 
other prior employees' reference material. 
* * * 
[Neither] you, nor we, have entered into 
any contract of employment, express or 
implied. 
Material Facts 11 13, 15. 
Even if Cook had identified specific written or oral 
representations or a practice eliminating Zions' discretion to 
grant or deny employee request for time off, they would have been 
superseded by the employee handbook. This is clear from Trembly v. 
Mrs. Field's Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994), wherein this 
Court held that if an employee remains employed after being 
notified of the issuance of a handbook, that handbook supersedes 
any prior representations or agreements. Id. at 1312-13. 
In Trembly. after certain oral statements were made to 
the plaintiff regarding disciplinary and termination policies, Mrs.. 
Fields distributed an employee handbook which, like Zions' employee 
handbook, superseded all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and 
procedures, and contained a contract disclaimer stating that ff[i]t 
223466 1 39 
does not constitute, nor should it be construed to constitute an 
agreement or contract of employment, express or implied, or as a 
promise of treatment in any particular manner in any given 
situation." Id. at 1309. Even if the prior statements made to the 
plaintiff created an implied-in-fact employment agreement, the 
Court ruled, the handbook's disclaimer "clearly superseded and 
replaced that agreement" and barred the plaintiff's implied 
contract claim. Id. at 1313. As in Trembly. Cook's retention of 
employment, after receipt of the employee handbook, constituted 
acceptance of Zions' offer: to remain employed at Zions under the 
condition that the handbook superseded all other prior employees' 
reference material and the condition that she had no express or 
implied contract of employment with Zions. See id. at 1312-13. 
A review of Zions' disclaimer also reveals that it is 
"clear and conspicuous" and therefore precludes an implied-in-fact 
employment contract. See Hamilton. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33 ("Utah 
courts have held that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in an 
employee handbook negates an employee's contention that the 
employment relationship is other than at will."); Kirberg, 872 P.2d 
at 41 n.3 ("[A]n implied-in-fact employment contract cannot be 
construed from the content of an employee handbook where 'an 
employee handbook contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer 
contractual liability.'") (quoting Hodgson. 844 P.2d at 334). 
Here, the text of Zions' disclaimer is prominent -- it is 
clearly enumerated and set forth in the "Introduction" and in the 
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very next section of the handbook entitled "How Long Will You Be 
Employed With Zions?". The placement of the disclaimer is also 
such that a reasonable employee ought to notice it — on the first 
interior page of the handbook. Finally, the language of the 
disclaimer is unambiguous -- it specifically informs employees that 
the handbook "supersedes and replaces all other prior employees' 
reference material" and that neither party has "entered into any 
contract of employment, express or implied." Under these 
circumstances, no contract could exist between Cook and Zions. See 
Hamilton, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. 
The fact that the handbook repeatedly informs employees 
that the contents contained therein are "guidelines" for management 
also defeats any claim that they create contractual rights. See 
Material Facts 11 9/ 14; Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Contract Claims of All Plaintiffs Kreimeyer. et 
ah, v. Hercules, Inc., Civ. No. 92-NC-088S at 9-10 (D. Utah Sept. 
27, 1994) (implied contract claim dismissed where procedure relied 
upon by plaintiffs was a "guideline": "The plaintiffs could not 
reasonably consider it an offer to modify the parties' at-will 
relationship.") (R. at 83-84); Knights v. Hewlett Packard, 281 
Cal. Rptr. 295, 298 (Cal. App. 1991) (personnel policies which were 
intended as a "guide for supervisors involved with employment 
termination" held to be too discretionary to form the basis of an 
implied contract). 
223466 1 41 
Cook attempts to escape the consequences of accepting 
Zions' contract disclaimer by arguing tha t i t should not apply to 
her because she did not receive i t u n t i l a f t e r she a l legedly 
requested the time off. Appel lant ' s Opening Brief a t 30-31. 
However, even i f the Court were to conclude tha t the contract 
disclaimer in the 1994 handbook i s inef fec t ive under Trembly, 
Cook's claim i s barred by the i den t i ca l disclaimer contained in 
Zions' 1992 employee handbook. See Material Facts 1 8. Although 
Cook denies receiving "any handbook u n t i l April 8, 1994, lf her 
ac tual rece ip t of the handbook i s not necessary. See Appel lant ' s 
Opening Brief a t 30.15 Even when an employee denies receiving a 
pol icy statement containing a disclaimer, the statement i s 
e f fec t ive if, as in the present case, there has been a general 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the statement. Material Facts 1 7; see E l l i o t t v. 
Board of Trustees of Montgomery County Community College, 104 Md. 
App. 93, 655 A.2d 46, 52 (1995) ("We hold t h a t , in reference to 
disclaimers and employee handbooks or manuals, reasonable 
no t i f i c a t i on , not ac tua l n o t i f i c a t i o n , i s su f f i c i en t to put the 
15
 Since the p a r t i e s br ie fed Zions' summary judgment motion, Zions has 
i d e n t i f i e d addit ional documents responsive to Cook's document requests pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 2 6 ( e ) . Among the documents Zions located and produced to 
Cook's counsel are Zions' 1990 employee handbook and the acknowledgement of 
rece ipt of the employee handbook signed by Cook on May 14, 1990, ne i ther of which 
i s part of the record in the d i s t r i c t court. The 1990 handbook, which, according 
to the signature page, Cook received on May 14, 1990, contains contract 
disclaimers and p o l i c y gu ide l ines regarding attendance and absences that are 
ident i ca l to those in the 1992 and 1994 employee handbooks. Material Facts HH 8, 
10, 11, 13, 16, 17. In order to preserve and perpetuate Cook's testimony for 
t r i a l , Cook's counsel took the deposi t ion of Cook on January 15 and 16, 1996. 
If appropriate, Zions w i l l take the necessary procedural s teps t o supplement the 
record to include these documents, along with Cook's depos i t ion testimony 
r e l a t i n g thereto , on appeal. 
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employee on notice of the disclaimer. We further hold that a 
uniform, system-wide distribution of a disclaimer will generally 
constitute reasonable notice thereof.11) ; Transou v. Electronic Data 
System, 767 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("Though 
plaintiff claims that he does not recall receiving a copy of the 
handbook, its disclaimer is effective in light of the uniform and 
reasonable method of distributing the manual throughout the 
company."); Grow v. General Prods., Inc.. 184 Mich. App. 379, 457 
N.W. 2d 167, 171 (1990) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that 
disclaimer in policy memorandum did not apply to him, the court 
stated: "[a]1though plaintiff claims he did not receive the 
memorandum, the method of notification of distributing written 
memorandums addressed to each employee at a staff meeting is 
reasonable and evidences no bad faith"). 
Cook also cannot rely on the attendance and short-term 
leave guidelines in the 1994 employee handbook, which are exactly 
the same as those in the 1992 handbook, and ignore the remainder of 
the handbook including the contract disclaimer. While employment 
policies in a handbook or other publications can be the source of 
implied contract terms, they must be read as a whole. See, e.g.. 
Snvder v. A.G. Trucking. Inc.. 57 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) 
("Plaintiff may not rely on one sentence while ignoring the rest of 
the manual."); Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys.. Inc.. 48 Ohio App. 3d 
268, 549 N.E. 2d 1210, 1218 (1988) ("[Plaintiff] cannot rely on 
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selected passages favorable to his position and ignore those that 
are unfavorable."). 
In sum, both the 1992 and the 1994 versions of the 
employee handbook clearly and conspicuously state that the handbook 
"supersedes and replaces all other prior employees reference 
material," and that neither party has "entered into any contract of 
employment, express or implied." By these words, Zions disclaimed 
any intent to enter into an express or implied employment contract 
with its employees. Under these circumstances, no contract could 
exist. 
VI. COOK'S IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT, AND BECAUSE 
COOK HAS NO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH ZIONS. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court Has Consistently Rejected An 
Implied Covenant Claim in the Employment Context. 
The Utah Supreme Court first considered the possibility 
of creating a cause of action for breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in the employment context in the Berube 
case. Only two justices were in favor of creating such a cause of 
action, Justices Durham and Stewart. 771 P. 2d at 1049. 
Accordingly, the court upheld the dismissal of this cause of action 
and remanded only the implied-in-fact contract claim. Id. 
Since Berube, the Utah Supreme Court has, by its actions 
and words, consistently rejected the implied covenant claim in the 
employment context. In Brehany. the Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the dismissal of an implied contract claim, while at the 
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same time it affirmed the dismissal of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing claim. 812 P.2d at 56-57. In Loose v. 
Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court 
stated that "[b]ecause Utah law does not recognize a violation of 
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . we must affirm the 
trial court's judgment of dismissal." Id. at 1098. In Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court affirmed 
"the decision of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 
840. 
Any doubt that the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is dead in the employment context was laid to rest by 
the Supreme Court in Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co.. 844 
P.2d 303 (Utah 1992): 
Three times in the past three years, we have 
refused to recognize an implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that 
creates a for-cause standard for dismissal. 
(Citations omitted.) As we explained in 
Brehanyf although every contract is subject to 
an implied covenant of good faith, that 
implied covenant 'cannot be construed . . . to 
establish new and independent rights or duties 
not agreed upon by the parties.'" 812 P.2d at 
55. W$ affirm that position which rejects 
Sanderson's argument to the contrary. 
Id. at 308. As it did in Brehany. the court remanded the implied-
in-fact contract claim, id. If the implied covenant claim were 
viable, the Utah Supreme Court would have remanded the implied 
covenant claim in each instance in which it remanded an implied-in-
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fact contract claim. By refusing to remand in such instances, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the implied covenant claim is 
not viable under Utah law. 
Even if Cook's implied covenant claim were viable under 
Utah law, like her implied-in-fact contract theory, it has only 
been contemplated in the context of a termination. See Sanderson, 
844 P.2d at 308 ("[W] e have refused to recognize an implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that creates a for-cause 
standard for dismissal.") (emphasis added). 
B. Because Cook has No Employment Contract With Zions, Her 
Implied Covenant Claim Fails as a Matter of Law. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to 
recognize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment 
contracts, Cook contends that Utah appellate courts have not yet 
rejected the cause of action altogether. In so contending, Cook 
relies on Dubois v. Grand Central. 872 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1994) . 
While it is true, as Cook correctly notes, that the Dubois court 
stated every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good 
faith, the court also reaffirmed the well-established principle 
that "this implied covenant cannot establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Id. at 1078. 
Relying on the implied covenant "to establish new., 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties" is 
exactly what Cook is attempting to do. As explained above, Cook 
has failed to prove the existence of any express or implied 
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employment contract, much less a contract which obligates Zions to 
foresee the "need" of an employee's medical appointment or 
procedure and insure the consequences of any delay in scheduling 
planned paid absences, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Zions respectfully requests 
that the Court affirm the district court's summary judgment. 
DATED this day of January, 1996 
LOIS I 
DOUGLAS R. DAVIS 
MICHAEL A. ZODY 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
223466 1 47 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /toTVday of January, 1996, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to: 
ROGER M. HOOLE 
PAUL M. KING 
HEATHER E. MORRISON 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
223466 1 48 
Tab A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
GINA COOK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 940905799 CN 
Judge David S. Young 
Deposition of: 
JOYCE MISDOM 
CERTIFIED COPY 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of October 
1994, the deposition of JOYCE MISDOM, produced as a 
witness herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named 
court, was taken before Rashell Garcia, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:10 a.m. of 
said day at the offices of Roger H. Hoole, 4276 South 
Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
RASHELL GARCIA 
CSRNo. 144 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
0 I) 0 6 4 2 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was for a surgical procedure? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this would have been in the end of April 
1994? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. Did she indicate to you how long Gaylene 
had not allowed her to take the time off? 
A. Not in some months or weeks or anything like 
that, no. She said something to the effect that she'd been 
trying for awhile, for a time, a long time, something, to get 
the time off. And I didn't ask her a lot of details as to 
why. I just said, "Well, you know, if you need to go to the 
doctor, you should go to the doctor." And she seemed quite 
upset by it, so — 
Q. She did seem concerned? 
A. She seemed concerned. At the time — she said 
she couldn't get the time off, Gaylene wouldn't let her have 
the time off. I said, "Then make an appointment and phone in 
sick." 
Q. Do you recall anything else that was said either 
by her or by you during this conversation? 
A. Well, after I said that, she said she couldn't do 
that, that Gaylene would fire her for it, that it's against 
policy. And I said, "Well, I realize it's against policy but 
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1 she wouldn't fire you." And she said, yes, she felt that she 
2 would be fired. 
3 Q. Do you recall anything else that was said during 
4 that conversation? 
5 A. I think I just made some comment that if you have 
6 to go to the doctor, whatever it takes, get to the doctor. 
7 Q. And this was in — well, you've already indicated 
8 the date. Was there a second occasion after this one where 
9 you again discussed with Gina the situation involving her 
10 lip? 
11 A. As I recall, the next time I talked to her was — 
12 in any detail about her lip would have been the end of June. 
13 I talked to her once on the phone between April and — the 
14 end of April and June. 
15 Q. Now, didn't she leave for surgical intervention 
16 during June? Do you recall? 
17 A. I don't recall whether it was May or June, I 
18 really don't. 
19 Q. Was she gone for some time? 
20 A. As far as I know, she was. I found out she was 
21 gone after she had left and had the surgery. 
22 Q. Because you're not there every day? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. So, in any event, you had one conversation with 
25 her by telephone either in May or June? 
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